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Abstract
This Essay discusses a number of themes which show the growing influence of European
Union (”EU”) law. Four themes were chosen to illustrate that influence. The themes are interconnected, and hopefully bringing them together allows the reader to get a sense of the unique
experiment which this “new legal order” continues to conduct. Part I examines the EU’s own
”federal question:” what exactly is the scope of EU law, and how is it determined? How does
the case law, in particular that of the EU’s supreme court, the European Court of Justice (”ECJ”),
determine the boundaries of the EU law territory? These questions are examined in various parts
of EU law, including, for example, rights of free movement, residence, and non-discrimination
conferred on EU citizens. Part II then looks at the other side of the coin: the relationship between
EU law and international law. The focus of this section is the recent Kadi judgment concerning
counterterrorism. This judgment confirms the autonomy of EU law, even in the face of United Nations (”U.N.”) Security Council resolutions and the absence of fundamental rights in the decision.
Part III concerns the relationship between economic freedoms and the protection of human rights.
This is an area in which the ECJ is able to make a specific contribution, as it is often confronted
with questions of how to balance free trade and free movement with human rights protection. Part
IV focuses on the cardinal principle of EU law: its primacy over conflicting national law.

THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN
UNION LAW
Piet Eeckhout
INTRODUCTION
This Essay is based on a paper presented at a conference in
London, organized jointly by the Centre of European Law of
King’s College London and by the U.K. judiciary. The theme of
the conference was “Legal Boundaries, Common Problems and
the Role of the Supreme Court.” It brought together leading
judges and academics from around the globe. Lord Slynn was
President of the Centre of European Law for more than a
decade, and sat on the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and
the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom).1 He was, sadly, no longer around at the time of the
conference, but he would surely have enjoyed its purpose and
focus. This Essay—which focuses on the growing influence of
European Union (“EU”) law and its relationship with other legal
systems, both national and international—is dedicated to this
eminent judge, who made such a tremendous contribution to
legal dialogue and integration.
This Essay discusses a number of themes which show the
growing influence of EU law. The four themes were chosen to
illustrate that influence, also for those less familiar with EU law.
The themes are interconnected, and hopefully bringing them
together allows the reader to get a sense of the unique
experiment which this “new legal order” continues to conduct.
Part I examines the EU’s own “federal question:” what
exactly is the scope of EU law, and how is it determined? How
does the case law, in particular that of the EU’s supreme court,
the ECJ, determine the boundaries of the EU law territory? These
questions are examined in one particular area of EU law, for
* Professor of European Law and Director Centre of European Law, King’s
College London. I am very grateful for the research assistance by Ms. Sarah-Nada Arfa.
1. See Lord Slynn of Hadley: Astute Counsel and Law Lord who Represented the Treasury
as its ‘Devil’ Early in his Career and was the UK’s Advocate General at the European Court of
Justice, TIMES (London), Apr. 9, 2009, at 67.
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example, rights of free movement, residence, and nondiscrimination conferred on EU citizens. Part II then looks at the
other side of the coin: the relationship between EU law and
international law. The focus of this section is the recent Kadi
judgment concerning counterterrorism. This judgment confirms
the autonomy of EU law, even in the face of United Nations
(“U.N.”) Security Council resolutions and the absence of
fundamental rights in the decision. Part III concerns the
relationship between economic freedoms and the protection of
human rights. This is an area in which the ECJ is able to make a
specific contribution, as it is often confronted with questions of
how to balance free trade and free movement with human rights
protection. Part IV focuses on the cardinal principle of EU law:
its primacy over conflicting national law.
I.

EU LAW AND THE FEDERAL QUESTION

The reach and scope of EU law keep expanding, in a
process which has been called “competence creep.”2 This
expansion is partly caused by the successive treaty amendments,
the latest through the Treaty of Lisbon,3 which entered into force
on December 1, 2009.4 No major new areas of EU action are
opened up by that treaty. However, it will contribute to
competence creep. The EU’s trade policy will be expanded to
2. See Stephen R. Weatherill, Competence Creep and Competence Control, 22 Y.B. OF
EUR. L. 1, 5 (2004).
3. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1 [hereinafter Reform
Treaty]. The Treaty of Lisbon partially renamed the founding European Union
treaties—Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) and Treaty on
the European Union (“TEU”)—and renumbered all of their provisions entirely.
However, the text of the articles referred to in the published form of the treaties is
largely left unchanged. See generally id.
To avoid confusion, all references in this Essay to the EC Treaty and TEU use a
parallel citation format and provide numbering both before and after the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The EC Treaty was renamed the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). While the TEU has kept its original
name, for the purpose of clarity this Essay will refer to the original version as “TEU preLisbon” and the updated version as “TEU post-Lisbon.” See generally Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/13 [hereinafter TEU postLisbon]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/5
[hereinafter TEU pre-Lisbon]. The consolidated version of the treaties with the new
numbering is available at http://eur lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm. The new,
consolidated version of the treaties entered into force on December 1, 2009, and
contains a table of equivalences between pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon numberings.
4. Reform Treaty, supra note 3, art. 6(2), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 135.
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include matters of foreign direct investment, thereby including
international investment law.5 The EU’s criminal policies are
moved from the third pillar (intergovernmental) to what is now
the first. This means that there will be greater judicial
involvement, the EU courts acquiring full jurisdiction in criminal
matters. It may also lead to more EU legislation in this area.
Earlier treaty amendments set in motion new policies that
are gradually expanding. For judicial purposes, the most
significant ones are those brought together under the heading
“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.”6 Those policies include
criminal law cooperation, alluded to above, but also immigration
and asylum, and so-called judicial cooperation in civil matters
(mainly conflicts of law and jurisdictional matters).7 Also of great
importance is the EU’s policy to fight discrimination. Originally
limited to nationality and sex discrimination, EU legislation,
called directives, adopted in 2000, extended antidiscrimination
policy to cover race, sexual orientation, religion or belief, age,
disability, and the like.8 The EU legislation establishes broad
principles, casting the courts in a central role. As can be seen
from this brief overview, the days that the EU courts dealt mainly
with economic matters are long gone.
These new policies considerably expand the EU’s federal
territory. There is, however, more to the EU’s federal question.
The nature of the relationship between EU law and the laws of
the Member States keeps evolving, and some deeper questions
are embedded in that relationship. Those questions are
connected to determining the proper scope of EU law. To which
persons and to what set of facts does EU law apply? This short
Essay explores such questions by reference to case law in one
particular, but important, area: EU citizenship.
5. See Commission Press Release, Treaty of Lisbon Enters into Force—Implications
for the EU’s Trade Policy (Dec. 1, 2009).
6. See, e.g., Reform Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2(63)–(64), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 57–59
(stating the limits of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in the “area of freedom,
security and justice”); see also Andrew Duff, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe, True Guide to the Treaty of Lisbon, at 9, Dec. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/files/Download/True-Guide-NEW.pdf.
7. Reform Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2(67), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 63–67.
8. See Council Directive Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation, No. 2000/78, 2000 O.J. L 303/16; Council Directive
Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial
or Ethnic Origin, No. 2000/43, 2000 O.J. L 180/22.
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A. Defining EU Citizenship
Citizenship of the EU was established by the Treaty on
European Union, commonly called the Maastricht Treaty.9
Citizenship is conferred on all nationals of the Member States.10
From a judicial perspective, the most significant rights conferred
on EU citizens are those to move and reside freely in any of the
Member States.11 Whereas prior to Maastricht such rights of
movement and residence were limited to the economically active,
they can now be exercised by any national of a Member State,
subject to mild conditions.12 The ECJ is developing a substantial
body of case law about the scope of these rights of free
movement and residence, and seems intent on putting them at
the center of the EU law experiment. Indeed, it consistently calls
EU citizenship the “fundamental status” of the nationals of the
Member States.13 Let us look at some examples of case law in
which the court pushes these rights to their boundaries.
In earlier case law on EU citizenship, the court often applied
article 18 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(“EC Treaty” or “EC”) (article 21 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”))14 together with
article 12 EC (article 18 TFEU), which prohibits any
discrimination on grounds of nationality “within the scope of this
Treaty.”15 Citizens exercising their rights of free movement were
entitled not to be discriminated against on grounds of their
nationality. However, for such discrimination to be caught by
article 18 EC in conjunction with article 12 EC, it had to be
within the scope of the treaty. The court has stated that this
9. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1.
10. Id. art. G(C), 1992 O.J. C 191, at 7.
11. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 57 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 17–18
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
12. See Council Directive on the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family
Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, No.
2004/38, art. 7, 2004 O.J. L 158/77, at 93 (referring to the need to have sufficient
resources as well as sickness insurance).
13. See, e.g., Grzelczyk v. Centre Public (Belg.), Case C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R. I6193, ¶ 31.
14. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 45.
15. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 18, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 15.
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involved both a personal and a material element.16 The personal
scope was limited to nationals of the Member States. But cases
also needed to come within the scope of EU law in a material
sense, because it concerned certain benefits covered by EU
legislation.17 Moreover, some form of discrimination on grounds
of nationality had to be demonstrated.18 These various elements
limited the scope of article 18 EC.19
In more recent case law, by contrast, the court is happy to
apply article 18 EC on its own. It continues to speak about the
personal and material scope of this provision. However, the latter
aspect is subsumed in an analysis of the effect of a particular
national measure on the exercise of free movement rights. It is
sufficient that such a measure may have some detrimental effect
for the “moving” EU citizen, for article 18 EC to apply. No
further link with EU law is required. The best examples of this
effective expansion of article 18 EC are probably the cases on
benefits for civilian war victims. Tas-Hagen & Tas concerned
Dutch nationals who were recognized in the Netherlands as
civilian war victims of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East
Indies (now Indonesia) during World War II.20 This status
entitled them to benefit payments, if since 1987 they were living
in the Netherlands.21 The Dutch legislation required the
beneficiaries to reside in the Netherlands.22 In reply to the
question of whether this legislation came within the material
scope of EU law, the court recognized that these kinds of war
benefits are within the competence of the Member States;23 there
is no EU legislation in the matter. Nevertheless, the Member
States had to respect article 18 EC,24 and this provision was
applicable simply because Tas-Hagen and Tas had moved to

16. See, e.g., Sala v. Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-2691, ¶ 28.
17. Id.
18. Id. ¶ 64.
19. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48 (prohibiting
discrimination based on nationality and permitting the Council to adopt rules
proscribing discrimination).
20. Tas-Hagen v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen-en Uitkeringsraad, Case C192/05, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,451.
21. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13.
22. Id. ¶ 5.
23. Id. ¶ 21.
24. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 45.
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Spain.25 The court then stated that “[n]ational legislation which
places at a disadvantage certain of the nationals of the Member
State concerned simply because they have exercised their
freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a
restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on
every citizen of the Union.”26 That was the case here: the
residence condition was liable to dissuade Netherlands nationals
who are civilian war victims from exercising their free movement
rights.27
These judgments establish a broad principle, which
considerably expands the scope of EU law. National measures
which hamper free movement or place moving EU citizens at a
disadvantage are caught by article 18 EC and no further
connection with EU law is required.28 On a continent where
people increasingly move around, the principle is likely to
become ever more significant. Fundamentally, it raises the
question of how territorially-based national legislation interacts
with globalization. Indeed, the basic issue in many of the free
movement cases is whether a condition of residence can be
imposed for the award of a social security or other benefit,
scholarship, student loan, tax advantage, etc. What connection
with a particular country is required, and when is such a
requirement justified?
B.

The Role of “Purely Internal Situations”

This case law on EU citizenship also puts pressure on what
could be called a counter-federal principle of EU law: the
principle that “purely internal situations” are not caught by EU
free movement law. Such situations concern facts and issues
confined to a particular Member State. A recent case which
exemplifies the strain on this principle is the Flemish Care

25. Tas-Hagen, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,451, ¶¶ 25–26.
26. Id. ¶ 31.
27. See Nerkowska v. Zakład, Case C-499/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-3993, ¶ 33. Other cases
exemplifying that a mere effect on rights of free movement and residence is sufficient
relate to national legislation on surnames. See Grunkin-Paul v. Standesamt Niebüll, Case
C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7639, ¶ 39; Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003]
E.C.R. I-11,613, ¶ 45.
28. See Nerkowska, [2008] E.C.R. I-3993, ¶ 32.
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Insurance case.29 This was a reference to the ECJ from the Belgian
Constitutional Court, about Flemish legislation limiting a kind of
social security benefit to those living and working in Flanders (a
region of Belgium).30 In fact, the limitation flowed from Belgian
constitutional law, which restricts the law-making powers of the
Belgian regions to their respective territories.31 In response to a
European Commission (“Commission”) complaint, the
legislation had been amended to ensure that migrant workers, in
particular those EU citizens working in Flanders but residing in
another Member State, could also benefit from the care
insurance.32 However, the question then arose whether the
benefit should also be extended to EU citizens working in
Flanders, but residing in the Walloon Region (the other main
Belgian region).33 The ECJ confirmed that EU law required such
extension,
notwithstanding
the
Belgian
constitutional
arrangements.34 Moreover, those benefiting from the extension
included not only nationals of other Member States, but also
Belgian citizens who had previously exercised their European
free movement rights.35 EU law protects all moving EU citizens.36
The net result is that all those working in Flanders benefit from
the care insurance, except Belgian citizens who do not reside in
Flanders and who have never worked or resided in another
Member State. EU citizens are better protected than Belgian
citizens. The ECJ was asked whether this was justified, but stuck
to the principle that purely internal situations are not within the
scope of EU law.37 It did however point out that the
interpretation of EU law could be relevant also to purely internal
situations,
in particular if the law of the Member State concerned were
to require every national of that state to be allowed to enjoy
the same rights as those which a national of another Member

29. Government of the French Community v. Flemish Government (Care Ins.),
Case C-212/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1683.
30. Id. ¶ 37.
31. See DE BELGISCHE GRONDWET [Constitution] art. 35 (Belg.).
32. Care Ins., [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, ¶¶ 37–52.
33. Id. ¶¶ 46–60.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
37. Id. ¶¶ 38–40.
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State would derive from Community law in a situation
considered to be comparable by [the referring] court.38

In other words, national principles of nondiscrimination
and equal treatment could universalize the EU law solution, but
this is considered a question of national, not EU law. Advocate
General Sharpston went further. She found that there was
something deeply paradoxical about the proposition that,
although the last 50 years have been spent abolishing
barriers to freedom of movement between Member States,
decentralised authorities of Member States may nevertheless
reintroduce barriers through the back door by establishing
them within Member States.39

She drew on case law regarding the EU customs union, according
to which no customs duties and charges having equivalent effect
can be imposed on trade between and within Member States. In
that case law the ECJ refers to article 14(2) EC (article 26
TFEU),40 which defines the internal market as “an area without
internal frontiers,” and “draws no distinction between inter-State
frontiers and frontiers within a single State.”41 The Advocate
General argued that the case law on citizenship should move in a
similar direction of not permitting internal borders which hinder
rights of free movement and residence.42
Even if the court did not follow the Advocate General’s
reasoning, the case shows how principles of EU law have the
potential of becoming more pervasive, and how they may
interfere with domestic constitutional arrangements.
II. EU LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE EFFECT OF
KADI
The autonomous nature of EU law is its very foundation. It
all started in Van Gend en Loos, where the ECJ established that the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community had

38. Id. ¶ 40.
39. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Care Ins., [2007] E.C.R. I-1683, ¶ 116
(emphasis added).
40. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 26, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 59; EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 14, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48–49.
41. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Care Ins., [2007] E.C.R. I-1683, ¶ 128.
42. Id. ¶¶ 135–44.
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created a new legal order.43 The norms of that legal order have a
direct effect on the laws of the Member States, and prevail over
any incompatible national laws. Those principles concerning the
relationship between EU law and national law are firmly
established. But what does the autonomy of EU law mean for its
relationship with international law? That fundamental question
was raised in Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council, a case putting in issue
a
U.N.
Security
Council
resolution
concerning
44
counterterrorism. As is well known, the Security Council has
broad powers under the United Nations Charter to maintain
peace and international security.45 Moreover, the charter as a
whole takes precedence, in case of conflict, over any other treaty
obligations of U.N. members.46
A. Autonomy of EU Law in Kadi
Yassin Abdullah Kadi and the Al Barakaat International
Foundation were listed in an EC regulation as associated to
Usama bin Laden.47 The regulation froze all their assets.48 It was
adopted to give effect to a common position adopted by the EU
under the second pillar.49 The common position, in turn,
implemented U.N. Security Council resolutions, which listed all
known associates of Usama bin Laden, including Kadi and Al
Barakaat.50 Kadi and Al Barakaat brought actions for annulment
before the EU Court of First Instance (“CFI”) (now the General
Court).51 That court turned down their applications on the
ground that any review of the lawfulness of the regulation on the
basis of general principles of EU law (fundamental rights, such as
the right of defence, the right to effective judicial protection, and
43. N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v.
Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin. (Van Gend en Loos), Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1.
44. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008]
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 299.
45. Id. ¶¶ 293–94.
46. U.N. Charter art. 103.
47. See Council Regulation Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed
Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated With Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida
Network and the Taliban, No. 881/2002, annex 1, 2002 O.J. L 139/9, at 12.
48. Id. art. 2(1), 2002 L 139/9, at 10.
49. Id. pmbl., 2002 L 139/9, at 9.
50. Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 23.
51. See Kadi v. Council, Case T-315/01, [2005] E.C.R. II-3649; Ali Yusuf v. Council
(Al Barakaat), Case T-306/01, [2005] E.C.R. II-3533.
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the right to property) was precluded given the U.N. origin of the
sanctions. Such review would constitute indirect review of a U.N.
resolution, and the court considered that U.N. law had the effect
of circumscribing the powers of the EU institutions.52 Only review
on grounds of breach of peremptory norms of international law
(ius cogens) was permissible.53 However, such review did not lead
to a finding of illegality.54
On the consolidated appeal, the ECJ overturned the CFI
decision. It did not consider the U.N. origin of the sanctions to
preclude review of the regulation on grounds of general
principles of EU law, in particular, fundamental rights.55 It found
that Mr. Kadi’s and Al Barakaat’s rights were indeed violated, and
struck down the regulation.56 The court’s reasoning is extensive,
but can be summarized as follows:

The EU is based on the rule of law, and that principle
includes judicial review of all EU acts.57

An international agreement cannot affect the
autonomy of EU law—which the court must uphold.58

All EU acts must respect fundamental rights, and
international obligations cannot prejudice this
constitutional principle.59

The judicial review in issue is limited to the EC
regulation and does not affect the primacy of a U.N.
resolution under international law.60

EU law respects international law, and this extends to
observance of undertakings given in the context of the
U.N.; the EU should take due account of the terms and
objectives of U.N. resolutions.61

However, the U.N. Charter does not impose a
particular model of transposition of U.N. resolutions,

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 84.
Id. ¶ 86.
Id. ¶ 156.
Id. ¶¶ 281–84, 290, 304–19.
Id. ¶¶ 328, 372.
Id. ¶ 281.
Id. ¶ 282.
Id. ¶¶ 283–85.
Id. ¶¶ 286–89.
Id. ¶¶ 291–97.
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and leaves U.N. members a free choice among the
various possible models.62

Immunity of jurisdiction finds no basis in the EU
Treaties. Article 347 TFEU (article 297 EC)—EU
Member States are allowed to give effect to
international obligations concerning international
peace and security63—and article 351 TFEU (article 307
EC)—EU Member States are allowed to give effect to
treaty obligations preceding their accession64—cannot
be understood to authorize any derogation from the
principles of liberty, democracy, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms which are a
foundation of the EU.65

If U.N. Charter obligations were placed in the hierarchy
of norms within the EU legal order, they would have
primacy over EU legislation, but not over EU primary
law, in particular fundamental rights.66

These findings are consistent with case law of the
European Court of Human Rights.67

The argument that the court should defer to the
Security Council because the current U.N.
reexamination procedure of terrorism listings offers
adequate protection of fundamental rights is rejected:
that procedure does not offer the guarantees of judicial
protection.68
The Court’s approach has been described as sharply
dualist.69 The Court emphasizes the autonomy of the EU legal
order. Judicial review in the light of fundamental rights is the
expression of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EU
treaties as an autonomous legal system, a guarantee which is not
to be prejudiced by an international agreement. Not even the
62. Id. ¶ 298.
63. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 347, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 194; EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 297, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 174.
64. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 351, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 196; EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 307, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 178.
65. Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 302–04.
66. Id. ¶¶ 305–09.
67. Id. ¶¶ 310–17.
68. Id. ¶¶ 318–25.
69. See Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal
Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2010).
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U.N. Charter is capable of interfering with that guarantee,
notwithstanding the charter’s primacy under international law, a
primacy which the court accepts.
The strong confirmation of the autonomy of EU law is
undeniable. But there is of course nothing new in that autonomy:
since Van Gend en Loos, this is the very premise of the EU legal
order.70 However, the notion of dualism is much less helpful for
the purpose of characterizing the court’s reasoning. Generally
speaking, the concepts of monism and dualism are outdated and
inadequate for a proper reflection on the relationships between
legal systems.71 Monism means that international law and
municipal law are automatically integrated, with international law
taking precedence.72 Dualism means that international law can
only be effective when incorporated in municipal law, by means
of some act of transformation.73 In Kadi, such acts of
transformation had already been adopted when the court was
asked to review: they are the EU common position, and the EC
regulation listing Mr. Kadi and Al Barakaat, which the court
annulled.74 The Security Council resolution was thus
incorporated in the EU legal order, and it is the EU legislature
that took a dualist approach.
The interactions between international law and municipal
law in today’s world have too many different dimensions for
blunt and abstract concepts such as monism and dualism to be
helpful. The Kadi judgment therefore needs to be put in
perspective, for it discusses but one type of relationship between
international law and EU law. In other judgments, the court
displays considerable openness towards international norms.
Most international agreements concluded by the EU are
considered to have direct (self-executing) effect, and the court
has been willing to apply norms of customary international law.75
Even in Kadi, the court on a dispassionate reading simply
70. See id. at 7.
71. See Armin Von Bogdandy, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the
Relationship Between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. OF CONST. L.
397, 399–400 (2008).
72. See Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, International Law and
Constitution-Making, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 467, 470 (2003).
73. See id.
74. See de Búrca, supra note 69, at 17–18.
75. See PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN—LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 274–344 (2004).
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confirms established rules and principles concerning: (a) judicial
review; (b) the importance of fundamental rights; and (c) the
relationship between international law and EU law.76 All acts of
the institutions adopted under the EC Treaty (now the TFEU)77
are subject to judicial review.78 All such acts need to comply with
general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights.79
When the EU acts under international law, for example by
concluding an international agreement, the EC Treaty needs to
be respected including all the judgments on external
competence. The EU concludes that the norms of an
international agreement need to be compatible with the EU
treaties,80 as the TFEU itself clarifies in article 218(11) (article
300 EC).81 The only point which the Kadi judgment adds is that
those rules and principles extend to U.N. law, notwithstanding
the primacy of the charter under international law, embodied in
article 103 of the charter.82
B.

Article 103 in Kadi

Most international law commentators are critical of the
court’s silence on article 103 of the U.N. charter.83 The only
reference which the court makes to that provision is an implicit
one:
any judgment given by the Community judicature deciding
that a Community measure intended to give effect to such a
resolution is contrary to a higher rule of law in the

76. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008]
E.C.R. I-6351.
77. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 218(11), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 146; EC Treaty, supra
note 11, art. 300, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 176–77.
78. See Les Verts v. Parliament, Case C-294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, ¶ 23.
79. See, e.g., Opinion 2/94: Accession by the Cmty. to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, ¶
34.
80. See, e.g., Germany v. Council, Case C-122/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-973, ¶ 62.
81. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 218, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 145–46; EC Treaty, supra note
11, art. 300, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 176–77.
82. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008]
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 10.
83. See, e.g., Andrea Gattini, Annotation of Kadi and Al Barakaat, 46 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 213, 226 (2009).
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Community legal order would not entail any challenge to the
primacy of that resolution in international law.84

There is no further analysis of the primacy rule. Nor is there
analysis in the opinion of Advocate General Maduro.85 Is this not
an approach which is too cursory, sweeping article 103 under the
carpet, as it were? As a matter of positive law, the answer to that
question is negative.86 It is difficult to see the relevance of article
103 in the kind of proceedings leading to the judgment in Kadi.
Article 103 addresses the obligations of the members of the
United Nations under the charter (and the EU is not of course
such a member), and provides that, in the event of a conflict with
obligations under any other international agreement, the charter
prevails.87 Article 103 therefore speaks to the obligations of the
EU Member States, but not to those of the EU. International law
is itself most serious about the autonomous nature of
international organizations: see, for example, the International
Law Commission’s work on the responsibility of international
organizations.88 In the light of such autonomy, it is difficult to see
what effect article 103 can have for the EU, as a matter of positive
law. Moreover, in Kadi the courts were not looking at measures
adopted by the EU Member States, which are of course bound by
article 103. They were scrutinizing an EU measure, adopted
under the EU treaties. It is the most basic principle of
international law that a treaty needs to be respected. One cannot
expect a court, such as the ECJ, which the EU treaties instruct to
ensure that acts of the institutions are in conformity with those
treaties,89 to disregard that instruction simply on the basis of a
provision in another treaty which, on its terms, does not apply.
Admittedly, it is not surprising that the CFI referred to
article 103, and that prima facie the provision appears relevant in
84. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008]
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 288.
85. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I6351, ¶¶ 18, 20.
86. See generally Piet Eeckhout, Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights,
and UN Security Council Resolutions—In Search of the Right Fit, 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 183
(2007).
87. U.N. Charter art. 103.
88. See generally U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission:
56th Session (3 May - 4 June and 5 July - 6 August 2004), U.N. Doc. A/59/10 (2004).
89. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 263, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 162–63; EC Treaty, supra note
11, art. 230, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 146.
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Kadi. If a case were to arise in, for example, the United States,
about whether freezing measures implementing a U.N.
resolution need to conform to the U.S. Constitution, the answer
would be quite obvious: of course they need to be in conformity.
Article 103 would be regarded as irrelevant because the U.S.
Constitution is a constitution, not a treaty. The EU treaties are,
again in positive law terms, treaties, not a constitution. However,
in Kadi the Court of Justice undeniably adopts a constitutional
perspective.90 The court uses the term “constitutional” in several
paragraphs when referring to the kind of judicial review and
respect for fundamental rights which the treaties mandate.91 The
judgment is constitutional because it characterizes the EU
treaties as containing constitutional norms that cannot be
derogated.92 It is constitutional in its approach of allowing the
penetration of international law only in compliance with the
relevant rules and principles of EU law. Here is, in the court’s
conception, a kind of municipal legal system, with its own
constitution (notwithstanding the rejection by voters in some
Member States); EU law is not a mere branch of international
law.93
C. Fundamental Rights in Kadi
A last comment on Kadi and the relationship between EU
law and international law concerns the actual review by the court
in the light of fundamental rights. One commentator has said
that the court “expressed important parts of its reasoning in
chauvinist and parochial tones.”94 However, one cannot see what
is chauvinist and parochial about the court applying fundamental
rights norms which are shared between the twenty-seven Member
States of the EU; norms which are largely derived from the
European Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”),95

90. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008]
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 4–5, 81.
91. Id. ¶¶ 5, 81, 202, 281.
92. Id. ¶ 202.
93. Id. ¶ 316.
94. de Búrca, supra note 69, at 3–4.
95. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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which has forty-seven contracting parties;96 norms, lastly, which
are very similar to those which one finds in U.N. human rights
instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).97 In fact, it might have been
preferable for the court to have pointed out that the human
rights norms which it was applying are by no means alien to the
U.N. legal system. Such a statement is absent from the judgment,
which is perhaps deplorable. But the point remains that the
court applied norms which the U.N. itself promotes and seeks to
enforce.
The main lesson which international law needs to draw from
the Kadi judgment is that, because international law increasingly
affects the position of individuals in ever more direct ways, it
needs to develop much better mechanisms for the protection of
individual rights. If improved protection had been afforded in
Kadi, the court would have been much more inclined to defer to
the resolution. In fact, the court intimated that a kind of
“Solange”98 approach towards international law is not excluded.
It devoted eight paragraphs to the Commission’s argument that
the U.N. sanctions system allows for the individuals or entities
concerned to be heard.99 The court considered that the current
reexamination procedure does not offer the guarantees of
judicial protection.100 But it did expressly refer to the “so long as”
terminology which the Commission put forward.101 There would
have been no need to engage with the argument if no “Solange”
approach were conceivable. If the Security Council puts its house
in order, one would expect the Court of Justice to defer to the
96. Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, The European Court of Human Rights: Some Facts and
Figures 1998–2008, at 1 (2008).
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
98. The “Solange” doctrine (German for “as long as”) is increasingly employed as
a method for courts to accept and apply the norms of another legal system, as long as
the fundamental norms of the court’s own system, in particular those concerning
fundamental rights, are respected. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974 (Solange I), 37 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 271 (F.R.G.), translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540;
BverfG Oct. 22, 1986 (Solange II), 73 BverfGE 339 (F.R.G.), translated in [1987] 3
C.M.L.R. 225
99. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008]
E.C.R. I-6351, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 319–26.
100. Id. at ¶ 322.
101. Id. at ¶ 319.
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U.N. system of protection. But for now, the court’s position is
akin to the first “Solange” judgment of the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany:102 as long as the U.N. does not
itself guarantee effective judicial protection, the court will
enforce European human rights norms, as it does in all other
circumstances. The court’s judgment should be seen as an
incentive for the further development and improvement of
international law, and not as a retreat from international law.
III. BALANCING ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In today’s globalized world, there is ever greater scope for
tension between the economic freedoms of trade and
investment, and the protection of human rights. At the
international level, there is an extensive debate about this,
particularly focused on the World Trade Organization.103
However, that debate continues to be largely theoretical in the
absence of disputes and rulings. The law of the EU’s economic
freedoms is more mature than its international counterpart, and
the EU’s internal market is more integrated than the world
market. These may be some of the reasons why this tension has
resulted in EU case law. There is now a considerable body of ECJ
judgments grappling with how to balance economic freedoms
and human rights; or in some cases, with how they may reinforce
each other. Again, the ECJ is in a rather unique position. The EU
legal system is quasi-federal, but it also needs to accept and
accommodate the diversity which the non-unified European
polity represents. Notwithstanding the common human rights
standards emanating from the European Convention on Human
Rights and assimilated into EU law, the Member States continue
to harbour different concepts of human rights protection. One
need only think of the debate about social rights, for example,
the right to take collective action (“to strike”), which is strongly
resisted in Member States such as the United Kingdom, and
seems to be a near inalienable right in others.
How does the ECJ approach these questions of balancing?
Let us look at some of the leading cases.

102. Solange I, 37 BverfGE 271 (F.R.G.), translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540.
103. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas Cottier et al.
eds., 2005).
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In Schmidberger104 the ECJ was asked to examine whether the
Austrian authorization of a blockade of the Brenner Autobahn (a
vital transit route from Germany to Italy) could be justified on
grounds of freedom of expression and the right of assembly.
Schmidberger, a transport company, had suffered damage as a
result of the blockade, which was the work of Austrian citizens
and groups protesting against the environmental degradation of
the Alps, resulting from excessive road transport.105 The Austrian
authorities had allowed the protests, and Schmidberger argued
that this authorization was in breach of the free movement of
goods, and claimed compensation for the damage caused.106 The
ECJ decided that the human rights at issue could justify trade
restrictions, and that in the circumstances of the case the
restrictions were not disproportionate, and therefore had to be
tolerated.107 This judgment clarified that respect for human
rights can justify a trade restriction. Human rights, one could say,
may trump free trade. However, the principle of proportionality
fully applies. This means that at least those human rights which
are not absolute in nature need to be balanced with safeguarding
the economic freedoms guaranteed by the EU treaties.
In this judgment, as in others concerning human rights, the
ECJ applied common standards of EU human rights protection.
It is in the very nature of human rights as “general principles of
EU law” to be a shared set of principles which underpin the EU
legal system. However, this common character of human rights in
their EU law version does not remove the diversity that exists
across the EU Member States. EU human rights are not a federal
law standard which trumps all national law.
An important judgment that illustrates this point is Omega
Spielhallen.108 Omega ran a so-called laserdrome in Bonn with
equipment supplied by a U.K. company under a franchising
contract.109 The Bonn municipal authorities intervened, however,
claiming that allowing people to “play at killing” each other
104. Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria,
Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659.
105. Id. ¶ 16.
106. Id. ¶ 20.
107. Id. ¶¶ 74, 91.
108. Omega
Spielhallen-und
Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH
v.
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9609.
109. Id. ¶ 3.
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constituted an affront to human dignity, which is a cardinal
constitutional principle protected by article 1 of the German
Grundgesetz (Basic Law).110 The case was referred to the ECJ,
which first established that there was a restriction of the freedom
to provide services, because of the involvement of the U.K.
firm.111 It then analyzed whether the restriction could be justified
on grounds of public policy under article 46 EC (article 52
TFEU).112 The court noted that, although public policy may be
relied upon only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious
threat to a fundamental interest of society, the specific
circumstances which may justify recourse to that concept may
vary from one country to another and from one era to another.113
A margin of discretion must therefore be allowed. The ECJ then
described how the German authorities and courts considered
that the simulated killing constituted a breach of the
constitutional human dignity principle.114 It emphasized the
importance of respect for human rights in EU law, and found
that such respect undeniably encompassed respect for human
dignity. Protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest
which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the freedom to
provide services.115 Then, importantly, the court clarified that
“[i]t is not indispensable . . . for the restrictive measure . . . to
correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as
regards the precise way in which the fundamental right or
legitimate interest in question is to be protected.”116 The need
for, and proportionality of, the provisions adopted are not
excluded merely because one Member State has chosen a system
of protection different from that adopted by another Member
State. The court finally noted that the prohibition at issue
corresponded to the level of protection of human dignity which
the German Grundgesetz sought to guarantee; the prohibition, by

110. Id. ¶ 11.
111. Id. ¶ 25.
112. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 52, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 69; EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 46, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 61.
113. Omega Spielhallen, [2004] E.C.R. I-9609, ¶ 31.
114. Id. ¶ 32.
115. Id. ¶ 35.
116. Id. ¶ 37.
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being restricted to the “play at killing” variant of the laser game,
did not go beyond what was necessary.117
The judgment adds a further layer to the balancing of
human rights and economic freedoms. In its earlier case law, the
ECJ had always emphasized that justifications that a Member
State invokes for restricting the treaty’s freedoms have to comply
with the EU law version of human rights (as general principles of
EU law).118 Schmidberger then showed that protection of human
rights could itself constitute such a justification. Omega Spielhallen
goes one step further by allowing diversity in how the Member
States apply their human rights law, as long as the human right at
issue is recognized by EU law. This is reminiscent of the “margin
of appreciation” which the Convention also permits. It is not
wholly clear, however, in which cases the court would allow such
diversity, or when it would insist on respect for a common,
shared standard, which it would itself determine.
More recently, the court has been confronted with even
more sensitive cases, which expose the tension—also at a political
level—between the protection of social rights and the EU’s free
market principles. The cases are linked to the 2004 expansion of
the EU, which enabled Central and East European countries to
fully benefit from the EU internal market, but also led to fears of
“social dumping” and protectionist policies in the “old” Member
States. The clearest case is Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking
Line ABP.119 Viking Line is a Finnish ferry operator which had
decided to reflag one of its vessels, the Rosella, by registering it in
Estonia or Norway.120 The reason for this was that the company
suffered from Estonian competition, and sought to enter into a
new collective agreement with a trade union in one of those
states, so that it could reduce wages.121 Both the Finnish
Seamen’s Union (“FSU”) and the International Transport
Workers’ Federation (“ITF”) objected to this reflagging and took
action against it (the ITF, for example, issued a circular to its
117. Id. ¶ 39.
118. See Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, Case C260/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2925, ¶¶ 42–44.
119. Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05, [2007]
E.C.R. I-10,779; Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C341/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-11,767.
120. Viking Line, [2007] E.C.R. I-10,779, ¶¶ 6, 9.
121. Id. ¶ 9.
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affiliate trade unions asking them to refrain from entering into
negotiations with Viking).122 Viking then brought proceedings
against ITF and FSU in the United Kingdom, arguing that their
actions were in breach of the right of establishment (article 43
EC (article 49 TFEU)),123 and the case was referred to the ECJ.124
The ECJ first established that the collective action
undertaken by the trade unions fell within the scope of article 43
EC.125 This concerns the horizontal effect of that provision. It
binds not only public authorities, but also applies where working
conditions are governed by collective agreements, and therefore
extends to action by trade unions. The court agreed that the
right to take collective action, including the right to strike, is a
human right which forms an integral part of the general
principles of EU law.126 However, it did not accept that this took
those rights outside the scope of the right of establishment.127
The court subsequently established that there was a restriction of
the right of establishment: the collective actions by FSU and ITF
had the effect of making less attractive, or even pointless,
Viking’s exercise of its right of establishment.128
The next question was whether the restriction was justified.
The ECJ accepted that the right to take collective action for the
protection of workers is a legitimate interest which, in principle,
justifies a restriction.129 It referred to the fact that the EU pursues
both economic and social aims, and therefore considered that
the economic freedoms must be balanced against the objectives
of social policy.130 In the case, the actual balancing
(proportionality test) had to be done by the referring court.131
But the ECJ did establish the parameters for that exercise.132 The
main parameter is that the collective action could only be
justified if the jobs or conditions of employment at issue were
122. Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
123. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 52, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 67; EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 43, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 59.
124. Viking Line, [2007] E.C.R. I-10,779, ¶ 22.
125. Id. ¶ 55.
126. Id. ¶ 44.
127. Id. ¶ 74.
128. Id. ¶ 72.
129. Id. ¶ 77.
130. Id. ¶ 79.
131. Id. ¶ 80.
132. Id. ¶¶ 80–90.
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jeopardized or under serious threat.133 Even if that was the case,
the collective action had to be proportionate, meaning both
suitable and necessary.134
This line of case law illuminates the relationship between
human rights and the EU’s economic freedoms in a number of
ways. The priority of human rights is not unconditional, but
subject to the principle of proportionality. That is not
particularly remarkable. The human rights which the ECJ is
asked to enforce or respect can all be restricted on public
interest grounds.135 At an EU level, free trade and free movement
constitute such a public interest. The Member States must, even
when taking measures justified on human rights grounds, take
into account the EU public interest embodied in the economic
freedoms.136 Their measures must be proportionate to the
human-rights aim pursued.137
However, not all questions have been answered. The
principle of proportionality is a flexible tool, which in itself does
not determine how the balancing act is to be conducted. The ECJ
has developed an extensive body of case law on proportionality,
and it is fair to say that the concept is employed in all kinds of
shapes and forms.138 The case law on human rights and economic
freedoms does not as yet create a particular type of
proportionality, adjusted to the specific issues that arise. Nor
does it clarify to what extent the human rights norms relied upon
are determined by EU law, or by national law.
IV. PRIMACY
The fourth theme which this Essay seeks to explore briefly is
the primacy of EU law over national law. The reasons for this are
twofold.
First, the kind of primacy which EU law has managed to
establish continues to be unique. The Author is not aware of any

133. Id. ¶ 81.
134. Id. ¶ 84.
135. Steve Peers, Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations, in THE EUROPEAN
UNION CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 141, 142–43 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward
eds., 2004).
136. Id. at 142–43, n.5.
137. Id.
138. TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 140 (2d ed. 2006).
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other international or supranational legal system that: (a) is
based on the principle that, in case of conflict with national or
municipal law, the international/supranational norm prevails;
and (b) makes that principle part of municipal law, both in
theory and in practice. The unique character of the primacy
principle continues to be a contested and sensitive issue,
notwithstanding the fact that it was established as long ago as
1964.139 This was witnessed when the ill-fated constitutional
treaty140 attempted to codify this principle: that effort was seen by
many as a bridge too far in the direction of building a European
state.141 The codification was abandoned in the Treaty of Lisbon
as one of the “constitutional symbols” that the negative referenda
in the Netherlands and France had rejected.142
Second, while the ECJ steadfastly confirms the absolute and
unqualified character of the principle of primacy, national
supreme and constitutional courts continue to emphasize that
primacy has its basis in national constitutional norms, and is,
therefore, not absolute and unqualified.143 The relevant national
case law continues to evolve, whereas the ECJ’s case law is fixed
and intransmutable, at least on the face of things.
So what are some of the recent developments in the case law
of national supreme and constitutional courts? Some courts are
moving in the direction of greater acceptance of the special
status of EU law. For example, subsequent to an important
constitutional amendment which appeared to put EU law in the
same category as other international obligations, the Italian
Constitutional Court nevertheless confirmed the special status of
EU law.144 The amendment could have been read as limiting EU
139. See generally Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Case C6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
140. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. C 304/1.
141. See, e.g., Stephen Charles Sieberson, How The Constitutional Treaty Identifies
Dividing Lines, in DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER
STATES—ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 59, 63, 75, 199 (2008).
142. See Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights, in THE LISBON
TREATY: EU CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? 235, 239 (Stefan
Griller & Jacques Ziller eds., 2008).
143. See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of
Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267, 267–68 (1981) (calling this the dual nature of
supranationalism).
144. See L.S. Rossi, Annotation, Corte Costituzionale (Italian Constitutional Court):
Decisions 348 and 349/2007 of 22 October 2007, and 102 and 103/2008, of 12 February 2008,
46 COMMON .MKT. L. REV. 319, 319–20 (2009).
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law primacy to a principle binding the Italian legislature, yet fully
subordinating EU law to the Italian Constitution itself. The
Constitutional Court, however, did not adopt such a reading.
The court differentiates between EU law obligations, which have
a constitutional status, and other international obligations
(including those flowing from the Convention) whose role is
subconstitutional.145 The court does, however, maintain the
concept of “counter-limits” (controlimiti), according to which
there continues to be review, at least in theory, of EU law
compliance with fundamental constitutional norms.146
Another example is the case law of the Belgian
Constitutional Court, which not only accepts the primacy of EU
law, but makes EU law part of its constitutionality review of
Belgian federal and subfederal legislation.147
There is, however, also more critical recent case law. A
couple of years ago, several constitutional courts looked into the
domestic implementation of the European Arrest Warrant
(“EAW”), a so-called third pillar legislative instrument, which
facilitates the “surrender,” instead of extradition, of criminal
suspects between EU Member States.148 The Polish Constitutional
Court simply established that the legislative implementation of
the EAW was unconstitutional, because the Polish Constitution
prohibits the extradition of Polish citizens.149 Effectively, it was
confirming a conflict between the EAW itself, and the Polish
Constitution. The Polish Constitutional Court did not accept the
argument that Poland’s Constitution could be read in conformity
with EU law.150 This somewhat confrontational approach is in
145. See id. at 324.
146. See Corte cost., 27 dec. 1973, n.183 (Frontini), Foro It. 314 (1974) (Italy),
translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372; see also Rossi, supra note 144 at 320.
147. See Thomas Vandamme, Annotation, Case C-212/06, Government of the French
Community and the Walloon Government v. Flemish Government, Judgment of the Court of Justice
(Grand Chamber) of 1 April 2008, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 287, 294–95, 299–300 (2009).
148. See Jan Komárek, European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In
Search of the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles,” 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2007)
(providing an overview and analysis).
149. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [TK] [Polish Constitutional Tribunal] Apr. 27,
2005 (EAW Decision), No. P 1/05, 4 Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego Zbiór
Urzędowy [Z.U.] [Official Collection of the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Tribunal] (ser. A) 42 (2005), ¶ 1.1. A full text English translation is available on the
court’s website at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/summaries_assets/
documents/p_1_05_full_gb.pdf.
150. See id. ¶ 5.4.
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line with the accession treaty decision of the Polish
Constitutional Court, in which it rejected, as a matter of
principle, the primacy of EU law in cases of conflict with the
Polish Constitution.151 On the other hand, in the EAW decision
the court maintained the legal effects of the challenged
legislation for eighteen months, allowing—indeed instructing—
the Polish constitutional legislator to remove the conflict with EU
law.152
The German Federal Constitutional Court (“FCC”) was
equally critical of the domestic implementation of the EAW,
regarding the terms under which it permitted the surrender of
German citizens.153 A complete analysis of the judgment is
outside the scope of this Essay, but the court expressed a measure
of distrust of other Member States’ criminal justice systems,
contrary to the basic premise of mutual recognition on which the
EAW is based.154 It required the German legislature to provide
for a case-by-case examination of requests for the extradition of
German citizens, so as to ensure that the requesting authorities
comply with the prerequisites of the rule of law.155 The FCC did
not accept that article 6 TEU156 (now article 6 of Charter of

151. See TK May 11, 2005, No. K 18/04, 5 Z.U. (ser. A) 49 (2005), ¶ 11. An English
summary of the case is available on the court’s website at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/
eng/summaries/documents/k_18_04_gb.pdf.
152. See EAW Decision, 4 Z.U. (ser. A) 42 (2005), ¶ 5.2.
153. BVerfG July 18, 2005 (European Arrest Warrant Act Case), 58 BVerfGE 2289, ¶
119 (F.R.G.), translated in [2006] 1 C.M.L.R. 16.
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ 78.
156. Article 6 TEU pre-Lisbon provides:
1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which
are common to the Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community
law.
3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.
4. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its
objectives and carry through its policies.
TEU pre-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 6, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 12.
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union)157 and preamble
paragraph 8 TFEU158 offers sufficient guarantees.159 It stated that
[t]he mere existence of this provision . . . and the existence
of an all-European standard of human rights protection
established by the [Convention] do not, however, justify the
assumption that the rule-of-law structures are synchronized
between the Member States of the European Union as
regards substantive law and that a corresponding
examination at the national level on a case-by-case basis is
therefore superfluous. In this respect, putting into effect a
strict principle of mutual recognition, and the extensive
statement of mutual confidence among the states that is
connected with it, cannot restrict the constitutional
guarantee of the fundamental rights.160

The FCC also made critical statements regarding the
concept of EU citizenship, and its interpretation.161 Effectively,
the court said that the rights of EU citizenship and the
corresponding principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of
nationality need to be limited in scope, or else they might
fundamentally undermine the legal system of the German
Constitution by leading to a loss of the core elements of
statehood.162 In the same passage, the court confirmed that the
EU respects national identities, which find their expression in
their respective fundamental political and constitutional
structures.163 It further pointed out that the core elements of
German statehood are beyond constitutional amendment.164
This reasoning was disputed in the dissenting opinion of
Judge Lübbe-Wolff. She criticized the majority for considering
that the scope of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds
157. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 6, 2007 O.J. C
303/1, at 4 (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.”)
158. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 6, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 52–53. TFEU Preamble
Paragraph 8 provides: “[Member States] Resolved by thus pooling their resources to
preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of
Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts.” TFEU, supra note 11, 2008 O.J. C
115, at 49.
159. BverfG July 18, 2005 (European Arrest Warrant Act Case), 58 BVerfGE 2289, ¶
119 (F.R.G.), translated in [2006] 1 C.M.L.R. 16.
160. Id.
161. See supra Part I.
162. European Arrest Warrant Act Case, 58 BVerfGE 2289, ¶ 119.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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of nationality in article 12 EC (article 18 TFEU) was relevant to
the issues at hand.165 She continued:
Moreover, the information that following the principle of
conferral, the ban on discrimination only applies to specific
objectives set out in the Treaty deviates, in a manner that is
hard to understand, from the wording of Article 12.1 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community, which
requires interpretation. Federal Constitutional Court
judgments should not be used to send dark signals, which
have no connection to the case at hand, to the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, which recently
applied this provision somewhat extensively.166

The French Conseil d’État also had the opportunity, recently,
to consider the constitutionality of the implementation of an EU
directive. The Arcelor case involved a challenge to a French
decree giving effect to the directive establishing a greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading scheme,167 in so far as the decree
extended to the steel sector. The challenge was in effect an
indirect challenge to the conformity, with the French
Constitution, of the directive itself.168 The Conseil d’État pointed
out that the acceptance by the authors of the Constitution of the
participation of the French Republic in the making of Europe
created a constitutional obligation to transpose directives, which
could not in principle be obstructed.169 The administrative judge,
when faced with a claim of breach of a provision or principle of
constitutional value, has to examine whether EU law offers a rule
or a general principle which, through its application, guarantees
the effectiveness of the constitutional provision or principle
relied upon.170 In the case at hand, the claimant referred to the
right to property, the freedom of business, and the principle of

165. Id. ¶ 160 (Lübbe-Wolff, J., dissenting).
166. Id.; see also Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State for
Education and Skills (Bidar), [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, (concerning the right to
nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality, applied to student loans).
167. See Conseil d’État [CE] [highest administrative court], Feb. 8, 2007 (Arcelor),
CE Ass. Feb. 8, 2007, Rec. Lebon. 56, translated at [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 28; see also Société
Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine v. Premier Ministre, Case C-127/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895,
¶ 7.
168. Arcelor, CE Ass. Feb. 8, 2007, Rec. Lebon. 56, ¶ 3.
169. Id. ¶ 4.
170. Id.
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equality, all recognized in EU law.171 Where the administrative
judge establishes that there are corresponding rules or principles
of EU law, the judicial inquiry should turn to whether the
directive complies with these rules or principles, and in case of
serious doubt, a reference to the ECJ must be made.172 On the
other hand, where there is no corresponding rule or principle of
EU law, the judge needs to directly examine the constitutionality
of the implementing decree.173 In other words, the Conseil d’État
reserves the right to intervene, and to apply the French
Constitution, where the relevant constitutional rules or principles
have no counterpart in EU law.
In Arcelor, the Conseil d’État made a reference to the ECJ,
asking whether the directive was in breach of the principle of
equal treatment by including the steel sector, and by not
including other, competing sectors (plastic and aluminium).174
The ECJ found that there was no breach, and did not in its
judgment refer to the constitutionality test which the Conseil
d’État employed.175 Advocate General Maduro, however,
discussed this, and eloquently argued that the concurrent claims
to legal sovereignty, the protection of the national constitution,
and respect for EU law primacy could be reconciled.176 The EU
and the national legal orders, he pointed out, are founded on
the same fundamental legal values.177 Article 6 TEU expresses the
respect due to national constitutional values, and indicates how
best to prevent any real conflict with them, by anchoring the
constitutional foundations of the EU in the constitutional
principles common to the Member States.178 The Member States
are thus reassured that EU law will not threaten the fundamental
values of their constitutions. But they need to recognize that the
task of reviewing EU acts in the light of those values is transferred
to the Court of Justice, and cannot be done on the basis of
national constitutions. Otherwise, there could be a lack of

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id..
Id.
Id.
Arcelor, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶¶ 5–21.
Id. ¶ 73.
Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Arcelor, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶ 15.
Id.
Id.
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uniformity which would undermine the idea that the EU is based
on the rule of law:
In other words, the effect of being able to rely on national
constitutions to require the selective and discriminatory
application of Community provisions in the territory of the
Union would, paradoxically, be to distort the conformity of
the Community legal order with the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States.179

The primacy of EU law is therefore a primordial requirement of
the EU legal order. All of this does not mean that the national
constitutional courts have no role to play in the interpretation of
EU general principles and fundamental rights:
On the contrary, it is inherent in the very nature of the
constitutional values of the Union as constitutional values
common to the Member States that they must be refined and
developed by the court in a process of ongoing dialogue with
the national courts, in particular those responsible for
determining the authentic interpretation of the national
constitutions. The appropriate instrument of that dialogue is
the reference for a preliminary ruling and it is in that
context that the question raised here must be understood.180

CONCLUSION
Advocate General Maduro refers to the concept of legal
pluralism as a broad denominator for the relationship between
EU law and national law.181 Indeed, in European academic
literature, legal or constitutional pluralism has become the
predominant concept, or even theory, for the study of the
relationships between different legal systems.182 It has not,
however, managed to resolve all issues. Advocate General
Maduro rightly emphasizes that EU law is fundamentally based
on the constitutions and constitutional traditions of the Member
States, and that it offers full guarantees of respect for a European
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 15.
See, e.g., NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE &
NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 123–36 (1999); Miguel Pioares Maduro,
Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in SOVEREIGNTY IN
TRANSITION 501, 501–37 (Neil Walker ed., 2003); Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional
Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 317–59 (2002).
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constitutional common law. The Kadi judgment, discussed above,
confirms that the Court of Justice takes very seriously its task of
ensuring respect for fundamental rights.183 Indeed, if one reads
the judgment from this European common law perspective, and
against the backdrop of the court’s relationship with national
constitutional courts, the need for intervention in the U.N.
system of listing individuals stands out even more. Whether the
idea of pluralism is sufficient for explaining the level of
integration between EU law and national law is perhaps doubtful.
There is more to the relationship between EU law and national
law than a mere mutual respect for constitutional identity. This
concept of respect is adequate as an indicator and instruction for
how EU law approaches national constitutional identity. Omega
Spielhallen, analyzed above,184 constitutes one of the best
applications of this concept. The court is willing to accept that
the German constitutional principle of human dignity leads to an
interpretation and application of the EU law public policy
exception specific to Germany, and not necessarily shared by
other Member States.185 However, when the reverse question
arises, namely to what extent national law needs to respect EU
law, the answer is not simply respect for the EU’s constitutional
identity. The answer is that all of EU law prevails over all national
law, all of the time. Omega Spielhallen shows that EU law has room
for diversity, but that room depends on chapter and verse of the
specific EU law provisions in issue.186
In so far as the concept of pluralism suggests that EU law
and national law are autonomous, perhaps even self-contained
legal systems, it is not an appropriate expression of their
relationship. The degree of integration is such that any
autonomy is seriously curtailed. This is not limited to the
developing constitutional common law. The very mechanisms of
implementation and application of EU law make it very difficult
to draw boundaries between EU law and national law. The EU’s
main legislative instrument, the directive, is the clearest
exponent of the level of legal integration. All directives need to
be transposed in national law and Member States need to achieve
183.
184.
185.
186.

See supra Part II.
See supra text accompanying notes 102–11.
See supra text accompanying notes 112–13.
See supra text accompanying notes 112–13.
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the prescribed results, but are free to decide about form and
methods. Anyone who has been faced with interpretative
questions about directives and their national implementation
realizes the difficulty of drawing boundaries. Moreover, at a
jurisdictional level, the preliminary rulings procedure embodies
the level of integration, by ensuring a constant, wide-ranging,
and deep cooperation between the Court of Justice and national
courts.
What about the reservations against absolute EU law
primacy that national supreme and constitutional courts
continue to harbor? Commentators assume too readily that there
is a fundamental conflict between national constitutional case law
and ECJ case law. The absolute and unconditional character of
the primacy principle, as established by the ECJ, is quite simply
determined by the limited jurisdiction of the court. It can only
interpret the basic treaties, and has absolutely no interpretative
authority over national constitutions.187 In one sense, the court is
merely behaving like an international court when emphasizing
primacy: domestic law is never an excuse for non-performance of
international obligations.188 Of course, the fundamental
difference with international law is that the court has ruled that
this rule of primacy must be respected within national law.189 But
the domestic constitutional basis for this is outside the court’s
jurisdiction. National constitutional courts, on the other hand,
are only acting within their jurisdiction when analyzing the
constitutional basis for giving effect to EU law. Where they state
that there may be limits to EU law primacy, there is as such no
conflict. Conflict only arises where domestic courts decide, in a

187. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
188. See id.; see also Mattias Kumm & Victoria Ferreres Comella, The Primacy Clause
of the Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union,
INT’L J. CONST. L. 473, 473 (2005).
It is firmly established that a state when charged with a breach of its
international obligations cannot in international law validly plead as a defense
that it was unable to fulfil them because its internal law . . . contained in rules
in conflict with international law; this applies equally to a state’s assertion of its
inability to secure the necessary changes in its law by virtue of some legal or
constitutional requirement.
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 84–85. (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
189. See Kumm & Comella, supra note 188, at 473.
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specific case, not to apply EU law, for example, by declaring it
unconstitutional.
However, the absolute and unconditional character of the
primacy principle can only be reconciled with national
constitutional law as long as the scope and reach of EU law are
themselves limited. This is probably the most important
constitutional EU law principle. It is not restricted to an
appropriate interpretation of the principle of conferred powers.
The overall scope of the EU treaties is subject to constitutional
limitations. The case law on EU citizenship, analyzed above, and
criticized by the German Constitutional Court, is an example of
how substantive interpretations of treaty provisions are also
relevant to the question of drawing the boundaries of the EU
legal order.
Lastly, Advocate General Maduro correctly emphasizes that
primacy is, in practice, not a one-way street, but is subject to a
fundamental constitutional dialogue between national courts and
the ECJ.190 In that respect it is noteworthy that we are entering a
new phase: at least some constitutional courts have started to
refer certain cases to the ECJ. This is a most welcome
development. Too much dialogue has been conducted by means
of the “dark signals” to which Judge Lübbe-Wolff referred.191 It
would be much preferable, also for constitutional courts, to
develop a more direct and open dialogue by means of referring
cases to the ECJ. Such references should not be limited to
mailing a couple of questions of EU law. Supreme and
constitutional courts should take the opportunity to clarify their
own thinking about the issues to which the case gives rise,
including the issues of EU law. A good example is a recent
reference by the U.K. House of Lords (now the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom), to which Lord Slynn devoted so much
judicial energy.192

190. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine
v. Premier ministre, Case C-127/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶ 15.
191. See Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State for Education and
Skills (Bidar), [2005] E.C.R. I-2119; BVerfG July 18, 2005 (European Arrest Warrant Act
Case), 58 BVerfGE 2289, ¶ 119 (F.R.G.), translated in [2006] 1 C.M.L.R. 16.
192. See R (M) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, [2008] UKHL 26, [2008] 2 All E.R. 1097
(appeal taken from U.K.).

